The effectiveness of Federal Reserve bond purchases
On several occasions between 2008 and 2011, the FOMC sought to lower longer-term interest rates by purchasing large quantities of longer-term Treasury bonds or mortgage-backed securities. Three papers at the conference investigated the effectiveness of these programs.
In finance theory, most asset-pricing models do not have a channel by which the quantity of Treasury securities at different maturities can affect interest rates. Hamilton and Wu (2011) modify a standard asset-pricing model so that the quantity of longer-term Treasury securities can potentially play a role. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) study both the Fed's QE1 and QE2 bond-buying programs carried out in 2008-09 and 2010-11. They provide a theoretical decomposition of the effectiveness of Fed bond purchases into several different channels, and use evidence from a variety of financial markets to assess the importance of each channel. They find that both QE1 and QE2 had significant effects on longer-term Treasury yields, but a smaller effect on corporate bond yields. That is, the pass-through from Fed purchases of longer-term Treasuries to longer-term private-sector borrowing rates was only partial.
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen also find that QE1-which purchased mortgage-backed securities as well as Treasuries-had a larger effect on mortgage rates than did QE2. This suggests that purchases of securities other than Treasuries, such as mortgage-backed securities, may be a more effective way for the Fed to reduce interest rates that matter to the private sector.
Macroeconomic models and the zero lower bound
The other three papers at the conference considered various aspects of macroeconomic models and the zero lower bound.
Prior to the 2008 financial crisis, a wide range of macroeconomic models projected only a very small chance that the U.S. economy would run up against the zero bound. Even if the United States were to hit the zero bound, these models suggested it would do so only for a few quarters before recovering. Chung et al. (2011) re-examine these models to determine whether economists adequately accounted for any unobserved factors and uncertainty about model parameters. The authors find that previous studies did not adequately take into account these additional sources of uncertainty and that previous work should have expected the zero lower bound to be a more frequent constraint. Nevertheless, even taking these additional sources of uncertainty into account, Chung et al. find that the models view the recession of 2008-09 as very unlikely because of its size and persistence. The authors conclude that these models are too "well-behaved" in that they bounce back too quickly from even very substantial economic shocks.
Thus, future work should focus on the features of these models that propagate shocks and make them more persistent.
Eggertsson and Krugman (2011) take a step in this direction by adding a debt-deleveraging channel to a basic macroeconomic model. In the model, a tightening of lending standards forces households to cut spending dramatically, plunging the economy into a recession. If the shock is large enough, the economy runs into the zero lower bound and the recession becomes much worse. The economy falls into deflation, which makes the real debt burden on borrowers even worse, forcing another round of deleveraging and economic contraction. In this model, countercyclical fiscal policy becomes more powerful than usual, because Ricardian equivalence no longer holds. That is, even if households worry that future taxes must rise to cover the costs of current fiscal stimulus, so many households are constrained by their tightened borrowing limits that they would still prefer fiscal stimulus now. In the model, the stimulus even pays for itself by jump-starting the economy and preventing further rounds of deleveraging and deflation. Brendon, Paustian, and Yates (2011) also consider a standard macroeconomic model modified by including borrowing constraints. In the model, the central bank can purchase securitized loans on the open market as well as set short-term interest rates. When short-term interest rates are constrained by the zero bound, this second monetary policy instrument has large economic benefits, especially if monetary policymakers have difficulty committing to forward guidance for the short-term interest rate. In the model, although the zero lower bound still hurts the economy's performance, the severity of the constraint is substantially reduced by the central bank's ability to purchase securitized loans and help keep credit flowing.
Summary
The zero lower bound places a substantial constraint on a central bank's ability to use short-term interest rates to stabilize the economy. However, recent research suggests that the Federal Reserve still has other monetary policy options available. The Fed's purchases of longer-term Treasury and mortgage-backed securities seem to have successfully reduced longer-term interest rates. At the same time, though, there is some evidence that Treasury securities purchases in isolation may only partially pass through to privatesector borrowing rates. Theoretical models suggest that central bank asset purchases can help keep credit flowing in an economy that would otherwise be stuck at the zero lower bound. Even though the zero bound may be a more serious constraint than economists previously realized, papers presented at the conference suggest that the Fed still has policy options that can improve U.S. economic performance.
